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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this study the relationship between melancholy and gender is 
investigated in the works of Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler. In the first 
chapter Freud’s theory of melancholy and several lines of discussions 
relevant to the issue are covered. In the two chapters following this chapter 
that introduces the Freudian concept of melancholy, the discrete ways in 
which Kristeva and Butler articulate the psychoanalytic notion of 
melancholy and the category of gender are presented successively. 
Julia Kristeva investigates melancholy in conjunction to language 
and signification. In the melancholy situation, Kristeva diagnoses an uneasy 
relationship between the subject and language, and thus between subject and 
meaning. Failing to establish the necessary identification with the father, 
which would entail her entrance into the symbolic realm, the melancholic 
cannot compensate the loss of the maternal object, renounces this loss, and 
ends up clinging to the maternal object. Kristeva, by pointing to the specific 
relation a woman has to her mother and to her mother’s body, argues that 
there exists a necessary bond between womanhood and melancholy. 
Judith Butler’s theory of “gender melancholy” introduces the issue 
of power to the discussions about the relationship between melancholy and 
gender. In Butler’s work, within a Foucauldian problematic, melancholy is 
taken as one of the regulatory mechanisms of power in the production of 
normative heterosexuality, and together with its psychic and social 
consequences. “Gender melancholy” proves to be a challenging theory in its 
novel treatment of melancholy as intrinsic to gender as such.  
ÖZET 
 
Bu çalışmada melankoli ve toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkisi Julia Kristeva 
ve Judith Butler’ın çalışmaları kapsamında incelenmiştir. Çalışmanın ilk 
bölümünde Freud’un melankoli teorisi ve bu teorinin içerdiği tartışmalar ele 
alınmıştır. Freudcu melankoli kavramını tanıtan bu bölümden sonraki iki 
bölümde sırasıyla Kristeva ve Butler’ın bu psikanalitik melankoli kavramını 
toplumsal cinsiyet kategorisiyle nasıl ilişkilendirdikleri konu edilmiştir. 
Kristeva melankoliyi dil ve anlamlama bağlamında inceler. Kristeva 
melankoli durumunda özne ve dil, dolayısıyla özne ve anlam arasında 
sorunlu bir ilişki tespit etmektedir. Babayla sembolik alana girmesini 
sağlayacak gerekli özdeşleşmeyi kuramayan özne, annesel nesnenin kaybını 
ikame edememekte, bu kaybı reddetmekte ve umutsuzca annesel nesneye 
bağlı kalmaktadır. Kristeva, anneyle ve onun bedeniyle olan özgül ilişkisine 
işaret ederek, kadın ve melankoli arasında kaçınılmaz bir bağ olduğunu öne 
sürer. 
Judith Butler’ın “toplumsal cinsiyet melankolisi” teorisi melankoli 
ve toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkisi tartışmalarına iktidar meselesini sokar. 
Butler’ın çalışmasında, Foucaultcu bir sorunsal çerçevesinde, melankoli, 
normatif heteroseksüelliğin üretilmesinde iktidarın düzenleyici 
işleyişlerinden bir tanesi olarak, psişik ve toplumsal sonuçlarıyla birlikte ele 
alınır. “Toplumsal cinsiyet melankolisi” melankolinin toplumsal cinsiyete 
içkin olduğunu iddia etmesiyle özgün bir teoridir. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis, an investigation of the psychoanalytical notion of 
melancholy in terms of gender in the works of Julia Kristeva and Judith 
Butler is aimed. Thinking melancholy and gender together renders a fruitful 
space for both the study of melancholy and that of gender.  Considering 
melancholy in gender terms helps us to posit the issue of melancholy in a 
sociopolitical level of thought, rather than conceiving it in the largely 
individual-based perspectives of psychological and psychiatric discourses. 
This latter kind of perspective reduces the wide-ranging concept of 
melancholy to a clinical phenomenon. On the other hand, positing 
melancholy in gender context approximates us to the subject of melancholy, 
to its production, and reproduction. Through this study, we testify the way 
in which this subject is always and inevitably gendered, and we see how 
different gender positions require and evoke different modalities of 
melancholy.  
Such a discussion of melancholy-gender couple also contributes to 
gender theories. Gender as a very complex and extensive category, 
concerning a wide range of frames of reference, also consists of 
psychological processes like identification, desire, fantasy, and repression. 
Thus drawing on these processes, while trying to understand the dynamics 
of melancholy, tells much about the gender issue. 
 In conformity with the aim of the study, in the first chapter of the 
thesis, an introductory account of the Freudian notion of melancholy, which 
Freud undertook in his 1917 essay “Mourning and Melancholia”, is given. 
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This essay is of central importance to the present study not only because it 
has been a classic in the discussions about melancholy, but also because 
Kristeva and Butler maintain a dialogue with this text. 
 In the second chapter of this thesis, Julia Kristeva’s melancholy 
notion, which she developed in Black Sun, is scrutinized. Hers is a quite 
fragmentary, sometimes quite poetic account of melancholy, what she 
specifies as the melancholy/ depressive composite. Kristeva’s account 
underscores the central role of language for the speaking being with its 
function of producing and reproducing meaning, and remarks the 
coincidence of the break-down of language with the break-down of the 
subject in the context of melancholy. In Kristeva’s writing, a compelling 
relationship among melancholy, gender and language is established; 
whereby the melancholic appears as the female subject, who is in “an 
impossible mourning for the maternal Thing”. 
In the third chapter, Judith Butler’s “melancholy gender” theory, 
which is prominent with the way it includes the issue of power in 
melancholy discourse, is examined. Within a Foucauldian problematic, 
melancholy is taken as one of the regulatory mechanisms of power in the 
production of normative heterosexuality, and together with its psychic and 
social consequences. This theory shows how normative heterosexuality 
renders certain cathexes and their losses as illegible, and reformulates 
mourning as a political process. 
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Chapter-1: Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia”: A Theory 
of Loss 
1.1 Introduction 
  
 “Mourning and Melancholia”1 (1917) is a comprehensive essay, 
which sets the basis for the psychoanalytic investigation of melancholy, 
with its inclusion of a wide range of psychological issues and processes. 
This essay is also the one that inspires and sets the conceptual framework of 
the present work, and also of the works it cited and made use of. The essay 
not only deals with the explanation of the mechanism of melancholy, but 
also, at the same time, does present extensive contributions to the analytic 
body of knowledge. While investigating the melancholic state; the text 
contains several lines of discussions. Firstly, the text includes at its heart a 
very important argumentation about the mechanism of identification. 
Secondly, an account of narcissism, as a condition of the melancholic 
occasion, is covered. Thirdly, in this text, the critical agency as something 
apart from the ego, as an independent agency is intimated.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Freud’s essay “Trauer Und Melancholie” is translated into English often as “Mourning 
and Melancholia”. The works that draw on and refer to this essay use the two terms, 
“melancholy” and “melancholia” interchangeably; but in general the term “melancholy” is 
used in the works that cover this issue. Thus in the present work, the more common 
designation of “melancholy” will be used, except those citations from the translations of 
Freud’s texts, where the German “melancholie” is translated as “melancholia”. 
4 
 
1.2 Melancholy: A Common Pathology? 
  
 Before setting to engage in Freud’s theory of melancholy, we will 
draw on the concept of melancholy, and the sense in which Freud uses it. In 
the beginning of “Mourning and Melancholia”, Freud points to the 
uncertainty of the definition of melancholia, noting that “[e]ven in 
descriptive psychiatry the definition of melancholia is uncertain”, and it 
“takes on various clinical forms that do not seem definitely to warrant 
reduction to a unity” (164). Indeed Freud takes melancholy in two senses. In 
“Mourning and Melancholia”, he takes it exclusively as a “pathological” 
state, in The Ego and the Id (1923) on the other hand he takes melancholy, 
notably the melancholic identification as a pervasive experience lived by 
every person.  
 Jennifer Radden in “Freud and Love” covers the question of whether 
Freud conceived melancholic states as common and normal, or designated 
them as rare and pathological. Radden shows that Freud’s writings include 
both interpretations, and argues that his account of melancholy is vague. 
While Radden considers the originality of Freud’s theory of melancholy, she 
also thinks that he is affected by the older, Renaissance tradition of 
representing melancholy, which, she argues, rather than adopting a narrow 
definition of melancholy as pathology, engages in the experience of 
melancholy in terms of a broader scope. Indeed, Freud does have an 
understanding of melancholy going far beyond today’s notion of clinical 
depression, with its rich connotations. “[T]he fate of melancholia as a 
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mental disorder has not been what Freud’s innovative and striking reframing 
at the start of this century deserved,” (55) writes Radden pointing that these 
rich connotations of his writing has dwindled in medical and psychiatric 
analyses. “Left was a disorder of abject despair,” she concludes (57). 
Choosing Hamlet as his melancholic figure, it is obvious that Freud’s 
concept of melancholy, even when he recognizes it as pathology, is quite far 
from a comprehension of melancholy as abject and wretched. Like Freud’s 
melancholy figure Hamlet, the melancholic “has a keener eye for the truth 
than others who are not melancholic” (MM 167).  
 Although what is dominant may be the extensive pathologization of 
melancholic experience; there are commentators of Freud, who articulate his 
notion of melancholy as a major aspect of human condition. Judith Butler 
and Julia Kristeva, whose theories will be discussed in following chapters, 
despite their great divergences in their explanation of the relationship 
between gender and melancholy, on the one hand keep that sense of 
melancholy as pathology, and stress on the other hand that melancholy is 
intrinsic to subjectivity. Judith Butler argues melancholy to be a component 
of heterosexual gender formation in the present conditions of compulsory 
heterosexuality. Julia Kristeva, on the other hand, restricts occasions of 
melancholy, and takes melancholy to be a universal state and propensity 
especially for women, and also for homosexuals. These articulations of 
melancholy, by Kristeva and Butler, while stating the need to overcome 
melancholy, do also point to the positive and ethical aspects of mourning 
and melancholy. 
6 
 
1.3 A Failure to Lose: A Loss in the Ego 
  
 In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud begins his investigation of 
“pathological” melancholy by comparing it to the “normal” process of 
mourning on the basis of the correlation of the symptoms of the two 
conditions. Freud distinguishes between the conscious process of mourning, 
in which the libido is slowly detached from the lost love object until the ego 
is free and uninhibited; and the unconscious process of melancholia, which 
is marked not by the withdrawal of libido from the object, but rather by an 
identification of the ego2 with the abandoned object. Through comparing 
them, Freud aims to reveal the peculiarity of melancholy, its very nature.   
 Freud defines mourning as “the reaction to the loss of a loved 
person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, 
such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on”, which is marked by 
“painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the 
capacity to love, [and] inhibition of all activity” (164-165). Such inhibition 
and circumscription in the ego result because of the absorbing work of 
mourning. The process of grief is stated to end by the detachment of the 
libido from the lost object, which by no means is an easy task. The work of 
mourning is achieved through the testing of reality, at the expense of 
immense energy and time, in the result of which “the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again” (166). 
                                                 
2 In this chapter the use of the term “ego” is not in the sense as an agency of the psychic 
apparatus, but it used in the sense that designates “self”. 
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 Melancholy similarly is generated by the loss of a loved object, but 
here, Freud takes notice that “there is a loss of a more ideal kind”, that there 
is “an unconscious loss of a love-object in contradistinction to mourning in 
which there is nothing unconscious about the loss,” (166). That means, in 
melancholy, there may not be an actual loss, i.e. the death of the object, 
which is marked consciously. Rather, the object is lost as a love object, and 
that loss takes place in the unconscious of the psyche of the subject. Thus, in 
melancholy, the loss has something like an enigmatic character. The people 
around the subject of melancholy and even she, herself, cannot give a full 
account of the grief that is absorbing her. She may not perceive what she has 
lost, even when she knows that she has lost something. In Freud’s 
formulation: “[s]he knows whom [s]he has lost but not what [s]he has lost in 
them” (166). Also observed in melancholy is an imbalance between the loss 
and the response given to it, an unproportionality of the suffering in 
comparison to the occurred loss. The pain devouring the subject is hard to 
be accounted for by regarding the loss that has occurred. 
 In addition to the symptoms of mourning; painful dejection, 
cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, and 
inhibition of all activity; Freud observes that “[t]he melancholic displays 
something other than that which is lacking in mourning—an extraordinary 
diminution in [her] self-regard, an impoverishment of [her] ego on a grand 
scale” inferring that “in mourning it is the world which has become poor 
and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself” (167). The talk of the 
melancholic which is observed to be insistent and to be sharply directed 
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upon her very self with repetitive self-reproaches and self-abasements, is 
said to point to a loss in herself, rather than to the external world. Thus 
melancholy appears as something about the very ego of the melancholic. 
Freud pursues the process by which an object loss does turn out to cause an 
alteration in the ego. 
 Freud observes that the complaints of the melancholic by no means 
fit her, “but that with insignificant modifications they do fit someone else, 
some person whom the patient loves, has loved or ought to love” (169). This 
explains the contradiction that is pointed out about the melancholic: her 
belittling herself without feeling shame before others, and her behaving like 
someone who is done injustice rather than someone who is devoured by 
remorse. Freud argues that the melancholic is not ashamed or submissive, 
because all these self-reproaches are primarily reproaches against a loved 
object, which have been shifted away from the object on to her own ego.  
 In the light of all these symptoms and his observations, Freud 
structures the complex process of melancholy. In the following quotation, 
there is a compact account of the mechanism of melancholy, which covers 
the process by which an object loss turns out to be a loss in the ego. Freud 
writes: 
An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a 
particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a 
real slight or disappointment coming from this loved 
person, the object-relationship was shattered. (…) But the 
free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was 
withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not 
employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish 
an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. 
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the 
latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as 
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though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way 
an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the 
conflict between the ego and the loved person into a 
cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the 
ego as altered by identification (170). 
  
 According to this quotation, unconscious identification with the 
lost/abandoned object appears to be the determinative factor in the picture of 
melancholia. Unlike mourning, which is a slow and laborious way of getting 
to terms with loss, melancholy is “the repudiation of loss”, “a failure of 
proper grief”. Identification with the lost object is the mode in which the 
lost object is incorporated, preserved in the ego. For such an identification 
to be, Freud implies, there must not only be a strong fixation to the love 
object, but also the object-cathexis3 must have little power of resistance 
(170). Freud explains this contradiction by referring to the notion of 
narcissism, which we will refer to subsequently. In the melancholy 
condition, Freud specifies a splitting of the ego, and the emergence of 
critical activity. It is through the operation of the “critical agency” that—
given that the lost object is incorporated in the ego—the ego is judged and 
suffers as if it were the lost object.                                                          
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The term cathexis was introduced to analytical literature as a translation for Freud’s 
German term “Besetzung”. In Freudian theory the term cathexis is central and designates 
the investment/ concentration of libidinal energy in an object, idea, or person. Unlike 
object-cathexis, in which an object is invested with libidinal energy, ego-cathexis is known 
as the withdrawal of cathexis from the object and attached to the ego. 
“To cathect” an object, idea, or person, thus, means to invest that object, idea, or person 
with libidinal energy. 
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1.4 Ambivalence and Rage Inverted 
 
 In Freud’s representation of the melancholic identification, a process 
whereby “an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict 
between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical 
activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification” is included. Here 
two things need to be closely explained, in order to understand why 
identification with the lost/abandoned object breeds such pain and suffering 
in the subject. Firstly, a conflict between the ego and love object is 
mentioned. For Freud, this conflict is due to ambivalence, and he recognizes 
ambivalence in terms of the love object as a precondition of melancholy. 
Secondly, a splitting of the ego, a “cleavage between the critical activity of 
the ego and the ego as altered by identification” is at stake.  
 Freud writes that “the loss of a love-object to be an excellent 
opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself 
effective and come into the open”; and adds that  “all those situations of 
being slighted, neglected or disappointed” can import opposed feelings of 
love and hate into the relationship or reinforce an already existing 
ambivalence” (172). 
 Through identification this ambivalence relating to the object is 
turned round upon the subject’s own self as a conflict between one part of 
the ego and the critical agency. In this picture hate and other negative 
feelings are directed to the part of the ego altered by identification while the 
critical agency appears as the executant of the sadistic actions. Later, in The 
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Ego and the Id, Freud identifies in melancholy an “excessively strong super-
ego”, which “has obtained a hold upon consciousness rages against the ego 
with merciless violence” (53). The displacement of ambivalent feelings and 
the formation of the critical agency make the existence of negative feelings 
for one’s self comprehensible. It is through critical agency that the ego can 
judge, debase, torture itself like an object. For Freud, it is this sadism 
inverted on the self that explains “the riddle of the tendency to suicide” in 
melancholy, and makes the latter so dangerous.  
 Julia Kristeva in Black Sun writes of the ambivalence, the 
aggressiveness with respect to the object, which turns round as a suicidal 
tendency: “ ‘I love that object,’ is what that person seems to say about the 
lost object, ‘but even more so I hate it, and in order not to lose it, I imbed it 
in myself; but because I hate it, that other within myself is a bad self, I am 
bad, I am non-existent, I shall kill myself’ ” (11). Through internalization of 
the object, the suicidal act becomes a disguise of massacring the other. 
 Accordingly, the cause of melancholy appears not only as the 
internalization of the lost object, but also as the internalization of the 
ambivalent attachment to the lost object. We see that, the notion of 
ambivalence is not much elaborated by Freud, therewithal it also is not the 
most covered issue in the later commentaries of his melancholy theory.  
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1.5 From Narcissistic Object Choice to Narcissistic Regression 
  
 Above we pointed to the picture of melancholy, which, for Freud, is 
marked by a contradiction of the coexistence of a strong fixation to the 
loved object with the lack of resistance of the bond that binds the subject to 
the love object, and we added that Freud finds the key to this contradiction 
by referring to the notion of narcissism. Freud dwells on the issue of 
narcissism and on the relationships between the ego and external objects in 
On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914) in terms of the normal course of 
psychosexual development, and also by referring to some pathological 
states. In investigating the issue of narcissism, the concepts of “primary 
narcissism” and secondary narcissism” are distinguished. Freud argues 
primary narcissism, in which libido is exclusively cathected to the ego, is to 
be a characteristic of early infancy. In this phase of development, the 
differentiation between self and non-self is not recognized, and the infant 
enjoys full omnipotence. It is with frustrations that this state of primary 
narcissism is shattered. It is later in the course of psychosexual development 
that the libido is directed to external objects. Secondary narcissism, on the 
other hand, is superimposed on primary narcissism, and consists of a return 
to the ego-cathexis occurring after objects have been cathected and 
abandoned (75). 
 In the picture of melancholy illustrated above, we infer the existence 
of secondary narcissism, whereby the libido that is withdrawn from the 
external world is directed to the ego. Freud writes that melancholic’s 
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“object-choice has been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-
cathexis, when obstacles come in its way, can regress into narcissism” (MM 
170). Since the object-choice is affected on a narcissistic basis in 
melancholy, we infer that, the loss of the object is experienced as a 
narcissistic loss, and this explains the way the ego becomes poor and empty 
in melancholy.  
 Nevertheless, Freud states that the conclusion that “the disposition to 
succumb to melancholia […] lies in the narcissistic type of object choice 
[…] lacks confirmation” and hesitates “to include this regression from 
object-cathexis to the still narcissistic oral phase of the libido in our 
characterization of melancholia” (171).  
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1.6 Denying Loss: Melancholic Identification 
 In “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud deals with the notion of 
identification in the context of melancholy. The term “melancholic 
identification” is used to designate a type of identification, whereby an 
object-cathexis is replaced by an identification through the incorporation of 
the lost object. In this essay, melancholic identification appears as the cause 
of failure in proper mourning, an inability to come to terms with loss. In 
mourning, grief is resolved through decathexis; while in melancholy the 
grief is unresolved, since there is an identification of the ego with the 
abandoned object, and the bond is not quit.  
 In The Ego and the Id, Freud revises and extends his notion 
of melancholic identification, which was in “Mourning and 
Melancholia” taken to be peculiar to the melancholic state. In this 
new formulation, this structure is designated to be “common and 
typical” in human life. Freud points to the centrality of melancholic 
identification in ego development. He alleges the substitution of 
identification with object-cathexis to have “a great share in 
determining the form taken by the ego”, and states that “it makes an 
essential contribution towards building up what is called its 
‘character’ ” (28). Freud goes so far as to picture the ego as an 
elegiac formation supposing that “the character of the ego is a 
precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the 
history of those object-choices” (29).  
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Freud writes: 
When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, 
there quite often ensues an alteration of his ego which can 
only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego, 
as it occurs in melancholia.… It may be that this 
identification is the sole condition under which the id can 
give up its objects. At any rate, the process, especially in the 
early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it 
makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a 
precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains 
the history of those object choices (28). 
 If, as Freud argues, “identification is the sole condition under which 
the id can give up its objects”; then, it would not be possible to imagine a 
proper mourning, as depicted in “Mourning and Melancholia”, in which 
there is a final breaking of the attachment. Thus, melancholy may be taken 
as a means of coping with the loss, rather than regarding it as a failed 
mourning. 
 In this context, following this line of argument, it would then not be 
going too far to suppose that there is always something melancholic about 
the ego; that melancholy is not just a psychological disorder happening to 
some people, but it is of human’s “nature”. It must be the charm of the 
notion of melancholic identification that it is very much adopted outside of 
the psychology discipline, in order to shed light as well on social and 
cultural issues. Judith Butler, combining the notion of melancholic 
identification with Freud’s views on psychosexual development and the 
Oedipal complex, comes up with the theory of “melancholy gender”, which 
alleges gender identifications to be melancholic identifications. Julia 
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Kristeva on the other hand, following a quite different line of discussion, 
sees identification with the mother to breed melancholy.  
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Chapter-2: Her Mute Sorrow: Signification, Gender, and 
Melancholy in Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun 
2.1. Introduction 
Being caught in woman’s speech is not merely a matter of chance that could be explained 
by the greater frequency of feminine depression–a sociologically proven fact. This may also 
reveal an aspect of feminine sexuality: its addiction to the maternal Thing and its lesser 
aptitude for restorative [homosexual] perversion. 
–Kristeva, Black Sun 
 
Julia Kristeva’s Black Sun (1989) is an extensive study on 
melancholy, which investigates melancholy in conjunction to signification. 
The account of melancholy, she presented is distinctive with the stress she 
puts on the melancholic subject’s unique relation to signifying bonds, 
specifically to language. The book explores the origins of melancholy, the 
nature of melancholic discourse, and the ways of (re)constructing the bonds 
between the melancholic subject and the symbolic realm within the writer’s 
main project of conjoining psychoanalysis and semiotics. Kristeva, working 
mainly at the intersection of semiotics/linguistics and psychoanalysis; while 
analyzing melancholy, particularly feminine melancholy, presents 
explanations relating to the interrelationships between language, 
subjectivity, and the body. 
In Black Sun, Kristeva offers an interpretation of melancholy that is 
different from the classical psychoanalytic accounts of melancholy in the 
way that, while the latter deals with “objectal depression”, Kristeva 
investigates “narcissistic depression”. In objectal melancholy, what is at 
stake is a loss of an object—a loss of something that is “other” than oneself. 
That means the loss takes place post-Oedipally, after acquisition of language 
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and the self -other distinction. In narcissistic melancholy, what is at stake is 
not a loss of an object, but the loss of the maternal Thing—the loss of 
something that is undifferentiated from the self. Such loss points to an early 
loss, which is previous to the libidinal object relation, and takes place pre-
Oedipally, before the acquisition of language. In this context, the loss is 
experienced in a pre-verbal realm, in an affective state.  
Kristeva claims that, the loss of the Thing—the loss of the mother as 
the Thing—is experienced differently by the male and the female subject. 
Since the female subject has a unique relation to the maternal Thing, her 
losing the mother is more problematic, her reconciling with the loss is much 
more laborious. Thus, that specific relation to the mother, to the maternal 
body is alleged by Kristeva to render her more vulnerable to melancholy. 
The book opens with the sentence: “For those who are racked by 
melancholia, writing about it would have meaning only if writing sprang out 
of that very melancholia” (BS 3), thereby points to the main issue of Black 
Sun, the problematic relationship of the melancholic to signification, and 
that the meaning loss in the melancholic situation is to be recovered only 
through (re)signification. In the first two chapters “Psychoanalysis — A 
Counterdepressant” and “The Life and Death of Speech”, Kristeva 
explicates the melancholic experience, “symbolic breakdown” of the 
melancholic, “the blankness of asymbolia” in which she is sunk, and the 
function of psychoanalysis in helping the melancholic to gain her symbolic 
capacities, and thereby give meaning to life. In these chapters, which mainly 
concern our work, she presents an extensive account of her understanding of 
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melancholy. The third chapter “Illustrations of Feminine Depression” 
consists of case stories of her melancholic female patients, illustrating her 
theory about feminine melancholy, its connection to the uneasy relationship 
of the female subject to her mother. In the second part of the book, the role 
of art, specifically literature, the implication of affects and drives in artifice 
is considered. In “Beauty The Depressive's Other Realm” Kristeva points 
that art provides a “sublimatory hold over the lost Thing” being a 
“counterpoise” to loss (97). Art, for Kristeva, on the one hand, helps the 
melancholic to grasp, at least approach the lost Thing, and on the other 
hand, it expels that abject Thing, and its destructive charm through 
representation. In the following chapters, Kristeva covers the way that “the 
artist is melancholy’s most intimate witness and the most ferocious 
combatant of the symbolic abdication enveloping him” in the works of Hans 
Holbein, Gerard de Nerval, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Marguerite Duras. 
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2.2 Psychoanalysis, Signification and Melancholy 
 
Nothing takes place in psychoanalytic treatment but an interchange of words between 
patient and the analyst.  
—Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures 
Melancholia then ends up in asymbolia, in loss of meaning: if I am no longer of translating 
or metophorizing, I become silent and I die. 
—Julia Kristeva, Black Sun 
 
Write your self. Your body must be heard. 
—Helene Cixous, The Laugh of Medusa 
 
The relationship of subjectivity to language constitutes the very 
essence of the psychoanalytic practice. Because of the relationship between 
language and subjectivity, “the psychoanalyst can work backward from 
language in order to diagnose the analysand’s problems with self-image” 
(Oliver, The Portable Kristeva, “Introduction”, xiv).  Psychoanalysis, as a 
“talking cure” helps to bring the unconscious ideas to consciousness through 
language, and thus, the analysand articulates the unnamable suffering of 
which grip she has been locked. 
Kristeva elaborates on the relationship between language and 
psychoanalysis. Following Lacan, Kristeva maintains the role of language in 
the constitution of subjectivity, and looks into how the subject is threatened 
with the breakdown of language. Nevertheless, she by asserting the 
heterogeneity of all signification—that all signification is composed of two 
elements, the symbolic and the semiotic4 —challenges the Lacanian notion 
                                                 
4 In 24th note to the first chapter in Black Sun, Kristeva quotes from Revolution in Poetic 
Language, where she alleges the two moments of signification: “ ‘We understand the term 
semiotic in its Greek sense […] distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, imprint, 
trace, figuration. […] This modality is the one Freudian psychoanalysis points to in 
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of signification as the exclusive realm of the paternal law. She argues that 
the logic of signification is already present in the materiality of the body 
(Oliver, xvi). It is by the means of the semiotic element of signification, 
through which affects make their way into signification, the melancholic 
experience may be addressed, the affective character of the melancholic 
suffering may be represented, thus managed to be resolved.  
Kristeva observes in melancholy the disintegration of semiotic 
imprints (drive related representatives and affect representations) from 
signifiers (BS 52), and takes it as a primary feature of melancholic state. For 
Kristeva, the striking symptom of the melancholic is psychomotor, 
affective, ideational, and linguistic retardation (34)—a general failure in 
concatenating signifiers (words and actions) (40). Melancholic’s speech 
reveals her disbelief in language: it is repetitive, monotonous; broken with 
gaps, silences, and unable to complete verbal sequences. Since it is language 
                                                                                                                            
postulating not only the facilitation and the structuring disposition of drives, but also the 
so-called primary processes which displace and condense both energies and their 
inscription. Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who is not 
yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged according 
to the various constraints imposed on this body--always already involved in a serniotic 
process--by family and social structures. In this way the drives, which are "energy" charges 
as well as “psychical” marks, articulate what we call a chora: a nonexpressive totality 
formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is 
regulated” (25).The symbolic on the other hand is identified with judgment and the 
grammatical sentence:  “We shall distinguish the semiotic (drives and their articulation) 
from the realm of signification, which is always that of a proposition or judgment, in other 
words, a realm of positions. This positionality […] is structured as a break in the signifying 
process, establishing the identification of the subject and its object as preconditions of 
propositionality. We shall call this break, which produces the positing of signification, a 
thetic phase. All enunciation, whether of a word or of a sentence, is thetic” (43). 
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that constitutes and reproduces the subject, the death of language is the 
death of the subject. “For the speaking beings life is a meaningful life” 
writes Kristeva (6), and when meaning abandons the life, the subject 
confronts a deathly void.   
Through bringing the body into discourse by positing “the semiotic”, 
Kristeva like the other so called French feminists highlights the role of the 
pre-Oedipal, the imaginary, the maternal— which is ignored by the male-
biased psychoanalytic thought preoccupied by the Oedipal paternal factor — 
in the constitution of subjectivity, and access to culture and language. 
Semiotic negativity is what brings dynamism to subjectivity and language. 
Kristeva traces the semiotic in the ruptures of speech and subjectivity, in the 
drive-based transgressions that disrupt the coherence of the subject and 
language, in the avant-garde texts, specifically poetry, and in the borderline 
states of the subject. 
Since for Kristeva the signifying process is a dialectical process 
between “the semiotic” and “the symbolic”, the break between them breeds 
problems, causes the loss of meaning.  In melancholy situation, Kristeva 
diagnoses that an abyss separates words from affective experience, and thus 
explains the function of analysis: 
By analyzing—that is, by dissolving—the denial mechanism 
wherein depressive persons are stuck, analytic cure can 
implement a genuine “graft” of symbolic potential and place 
at the subject’s disposal dual discursive strategies working at 
the intersection of affective and linguistic inscriptions, at the 
intersection of the semiotic and the symbolic. (52) 
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Defining affect as “the most archaic inscription of inner and outer 
events”, Kristeva explains the transition from affects to symbols as 
occurring after separation—noting that “lack is necessary for the sign to 
emerge”—and through identification “no longer with the lost object but 
with a third party—father, form, schema” (23). Identification with the form, 
which is taken as an indispensable moment of child’s development, as well 
as the analysis’ aim, is an elaborate process that we will thereafter cover in 
detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
2.3 The Melancholic Experience: Impossible Mourning for the 
Maternal Thing 
I am saturnine, bereft, disconsolate 
—Nerval, “The Disinherited” 
 
Where does this black sun come from? Out of what eerie galaxy do its invisible, lethargic 
rays reach me, pinning me down to the ground, to my bed, compelling me to silence, to 
renunciation? 
—Julia Kristeva, Black Sun  
 
For Kristeva, the melancholic goes through “an abyss of sorrow”, “a 
noncommunicable grief” that causes her to “lose all interest in words, 
actions, and even life itself” (3). The abyss, that of sorrow and grief, tears 
her away from life, from language, thus she remains alone and mute on the 
far side of life, “[a]bsent from other people’s meaning, alien, accidental with 
respect to naive happiness” (4). She is both the nihilist, bearing witness to 
the meaninglessness of Being, and the mystic, devoutly clinging to the lost 
Thing; turning away from the worldly things, worldly meaning, and worldly 
language. 
Kristeva retraces the melancholy situation, and there she detects at 
the root a precocious narcissistic trauma. “The disenchantment that I 
experience here and now […] appears, under scrutiny, to awaken echoes of 
old traumas, to which I  realize I have never been able to resign myself” (4-
5). The melancholic seems to be saying: 
I can thus discover antecedents to my current breakdown in a 
loss, death, or grief over someone or something that I once 
loved. The disappearance of that essential being continues to 
deprive me of what is most worthwhile in me; I live it as a 
wound or deprivation, discovering just the same that my grief 
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is the deferment of the hatred or desire for ascendency that I 
nurture with respect to the one who betrayed or abandoned 
me. My depression points to my not knowing how to lose—I 
have perhaps been unable to find a valid compensation for 
the loss? It follows that any loss entails the loss of my 
being—and of Being itself. (5) 
 
The melancholic’s sadness does not point to—and cannot be 
explained with regard to— a loss of a specific, nameable this or that object, 
or person. Rather, any loss stirs the maelstrom of past, pulling her into an 
archaic experience of bereavement, “the disappearance of that essential 
being”, rendering her that premature being again. Since she lacks the 
symbolic support, due to a paternal weakness or absence, she fails to name 
that essential being as an object, to pose it as an other, to represent it; thus 
she fails to manage to lose it, to mourn it. 
Throughout Black Sun, Kristeva uses the terms “melancholia” and 
“depression” interchangeably, nevertheless she acknowledges a distinction 
between them5, which she ignores, and grounds her analysis on the same 
element involved in both: “impossible mourning for the maternal object” 
(9). She writes that “I shall examine matters from a Freudian point of view. 
On that basis, I shall try to bring out, from the core of the melancholy/ 
depressive composite, blurred as its borders may be, what pertains to a 
                                                 
5 Kristeva writes: “I shall call melancholia the institutional symptomatology of inhibition 
and asymbolia that becomes established now and then or chronically in a person, 
alternating more often than not with the so-called manic phase of exaltation. When the two 
phenomena, despondency and exhilaration, are of lesser intensity and frequency, it is then 
possible to speak of neurotic depression” (BS 9). In the following page, Kristeva writes that 
“[t]he terms melancholia and depression refer to a composite that might be called 
melancholy/depressive, whose borders are in fact blurred, and within which psychiatrists 
ascribe the concept of ‘melancholia’ to the illness that is irreversible on its own (that 
responds only to the administration of antidepressants)” (10). Relying on their common 
structure, throughout the text, Kristeva uses the terms “melancholia” and “depression” 
interchangeably.  
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common experience of object loss and of a modification of signifying 
bonds” (10). In accordance with the general view of psychoanalytic thought, 
Kristeva designates “object loss”, mainly “intolerance for object loss” as the 
primary feature—cause—of the melancholy/ depressive composite. For 
Kristeva, the second feature—both cause and symptom—of the melancholy 
landscape is “modification of signifying bonds” that she explicates as “the 
signifier’s failure to insure a compensating way out of the states of 
withdrawal in which the subject takes refuge” (10). These two features of 
the melancholy situation prove to be interrelated: the melancholic is 
intolerant for the loss of the Thing, since she lacks the necessary symbolic 
means to get over it.  
Let us look closer to the structure of “impossible mourning for the 
maternal object” that Kristeva diagnoses in the melancholic state. The issue 
of the maternal object takes us to the concept of “the Thing”. In Kristeva’s 
words, the Thing is “the real that does not lend itself to signification, the 
center of attraction and repulsion, seat of the sexuality from which the 
object of desire will become separated […] [it] is an imagined sun, bright 
and black at the same time (13). Although Kristeva does not directly equate 
the Thing to the maternal object, she uses the designation “the maternal 
Thing”; she takes the maternal body as representative of the Thing.  
“My necessary Thing is also and absolutely my enemy, my foil, the 
delightful focus of my hatred” writes Kristeva pointing to the abject face of 
the Thing (15). The melancholic is the one, who fails to separate her from 
the Thing, “to summon the anality that could establish separations and 
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frontiers”; since “[she] cannot inscribe [her] violence in ‘no,’ nor in any 
other sign” (15). When the infant fails to separate from that abject other, 
mother indeed, as Judith Butler argues, “the place of the maternal body is 
established in the body, ‘encrypted’ […] and given permanent residence 
there as a dead and deadening part of the body’ (Gender Trouble 68).  
For Kristeva, the loss of the Thing cannot be understood in terms of 
the accounts the classical psychoanalytic theory that deals with the loss of 
the object, in the framework of “objectal melancholy”. What she talks about 
is “narcissistic melancholy”, which points to a loss earlier than any object 
love/cathexis.6 Kristeva explains narcissistic melancholy as: 
Far from a hidden attack on an other who is thought to be 
hostile because he is frustrating, sadness would point to a 
primitive self—wounded, incomplete, empty. Persons thus 
affected do not consider themselves wronged but afflicted 
with a fundamental flaw, a congenital deficiency. […] Their 
sadness would be rather the most archaic expression of an 
unsymbolizable, unnamable narcissistic wound, so 
precocious that no outside agent (subject or agent) can be 
used as referent. For such narcissistic depressed persons, 
sadness is really the sole object; more precisely it is a 
substitute object they become attached to, an object they tame 
and cherish for lack of another. In such a case, suicide is not a 
disguised act of war but a merging with sadness and, beyond 
it, with that impossible love, never reached, always 
elsewhere, such as the promises of nothingness, of death. (12) 
 
As the above passage indicates, narcissistic melancholy points to a 
loss in the early phase of the human life, a loss experienced by “a primitive 
self”, which has not yet discerned the mother from the self; thus experiences 
                                                 
6 Kristeva maintains that classical psychoanalytic theory takes melancholy as objectal 
melancholy, emerges with the loss of the love object, toward which the self feels both love 
and hate. At the core of objectal melancholy, there is the mechanism of identification, 
through which the conflict between the self and the object transforms into one between the 
very self (11). As another form of melancholy, Kristeva points to the structure narcissistic 
melancholy that harbors an unfinished grief over the maternal Thing. 
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the loss of the mother as a narcissistic loss, as “a fundamental flaw” and “a 
congenital deficiency”. In such a case, when the loss occurs before the 
infant enters the symbolic realm, the infant cannot articulate what she has 
lost. Lacking faith in language, the melancholic is a prisoner of sadness, a 
mute prisoner of affect incapable of sublimating her sadness.7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Kristeva defines affect as “the psychic representation of energy displacements caused by 
external and internal traumas” (21), as “the most archaic inscription of inner and outer 
events” (23). The realm of affects is designated as enigmatic and vague, because “[n]o 
conceptual framework in the existing sciences (linguistics, in particular) has proved 
adequate for understanding this apparently very rudimentary representation, pre-sign and 
pre-language” (21). 
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2.4 Negation of Loss: “Matricide is Our Vital Necessity” 
 
The void of the lost object can only be compensated through 
language8. To say it reversely, the emergence of sign requires the absence of 
the object, or rather the acceptance of loss. As Kristeva states, mourning for 
the Thing “comes out of transposing, beyond loss and on an imaginary or 
symbolic level, the imprints of an interchange with the other articulated 
according to a certain [semiotic] order” (40). What is at stake is indeed a 
translation of semiotic imprints of an interchange with the other—that of 
drive-related, affective traces of a symbiotic relationship with the mother/ 
the Thing—to signification.  
That critical task of transposition consists of two facets: the 
mourning gone through for the object (and in its shadow the 
mourning for the archaic Thing), and the subject’s acceptance 
of a set of signs (signifying precisely because of the absence 
of the object) only thus opens to serial organization. (41) 
 
Under the condition that one consents to lose the object, and 
translates that loss to signifying bonds she triumphs over melancholy. The 
transition to symbolic order presumes the consent to lose the essential 
object. Consenting to lose her mother, the child finds her again first in 
imagination, then in words. Kristeva calls this process negation9. The 
depressed is the one who disavows negation. She is the fanatic who remains 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that, language here refers to language in its heterogeneity, involving 
both the semiotic and the symbolic elements of language; not to language as symbolic 
order. 
9 Kristeva makes a distinction between denial and negation: “ I shall call denial the 
rejection of the signifier as well as semiotic representatives of drives and affects. Negation 
will be understood as the intellectual process that leads the repressed to representation on 
the condition of denying it and, on that account, shares in the signifier’s advent” (BS 44). 
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faithful to her loss through her depression. She has “lost the meaning, the 
value of [her] mother tongue for want of losing the mother”, whereby the 
lost body of the mother thus remains “walled up within the crypt of the 
inexpressible affect” (53). 
At the core of melancholy, at the core of that impossible mourning 
for the maternal Thing, Kristeva determines a paternal failure, a paternal 
absence. She links the denial of signifiers in depressive speech to the denial 
of the father's function. The paternal function, to which Kristeva refers as a 
condition of negating the loss of the maternal Thing, is not just the Oedipal 
function. In addition to the stern Oedipal paternal figure, she introduces the 
notion of “the imaginary father” as a supporting and loving father that is 
inspired by Freud’s notion of the father in individual prehistory, with which 
one sets up her first identification. 
 For Kristeva, owing to imaginary father, separation from mother is 
not only painful but also pleasurable; in a sense it establishes the link 
between love and symbol.10 The “primary identification” with “the father in 
individual prehistory” “provides a compensation for the Thing, and secures 
the subject to another dimension, that of imaginary adherence, reminding 
                                                 
10 Kelly Oliver writes: “In ‘Freud and Love,’ against Lacan, Kristeva suggests that the 
paternal function does not just include castration threats and law. The father is not merely 
the stern father of the law. Rather, she proposes a loving father, what she calls ‘the 
imaginary father.’ The imaginary father provides the loving support that enables the child 
to abject, or separate from, its mother and enter the social. […] On the traditional model of 
both Lacan and Freud, the child enters the social or language out of fear of castration. […] 
Kristeva insists, however, that separation begins prior to the mirror stage or Oedipal 
situation and that this separation is not only painful but also pleasurable” (The Portable 
Kristeva, p.133-134.) 
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one of the bond of faith, which is just what disintegrates in the depressed 
person” (13).  
In the melancholy situation, primary identification is not as strong as 
to ensure future symbolic identifications, and this results in failing to 
commit matricide, thus failing to become a subject. Matricide is a question 
of life for one, since when matricidal drive is prevented, given that the 
maternal object has been introjected, this destructive drive is inverted on the 
self, possibly bearing one to suicide. 
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2.5 Feminine Melancholy: A Fate? 
 
“For man and for woman the loss of the mother is a biological and 
psychic necessity, the first step on the way to becoming autonomous” writes 
Kristeva, and embarks on her striking claim that “[m]atricide is our vital 
necessity, the sine qua non condition of our individuation” (27-28). The 
prevention of matricidal drive, results in an inversion of the matricidal drive 
on the self, and a consequent melancholic putting death of the self takes 
place, instead of matricide. For Kristeva, matricide must be eroticized 
provided that it is to take place under optimal circumstances. This 
eroticization is achieved in three ways. In the first instance, the lost object 
may be recovered as erotic object, as in the case of male heterosexuality and 
female homosexuality. In the second instance, the lost object is transformed 
into a sublime erotic object through social, cultural, and aesthetic 
productions. In the third instance, the lost object  “is transposed by means of 
an unbelievable symbolic effort, the advent of which one can only admire, 
which eroticizes the other (the other sex, in the case of heterosexual 
woman)” (28). 
Since a woman’s “specular identification with the mother” and her 
“introjection of the maternal body and self” is more immediate, Kristeva 
claims matricide to be more difficult for a woman (28). One makes of the 
mother a “death-bearing woman” in order to expel her. Nevertheless, in case 
of a woman, this process is more difficult: “Indeed, how can She be that 
bloodthirsty Fury, since I am She (sexually and narcissistically), She is I?” 
33 
 
What is consequent is “only an implosive mood that walls itself in and kills 
me secretly” (29). Given her maternal identification, the destructive drive is 
not turned outside—as action, representation, or creation—it is turned 
inside. 
Repression of both the maternal love and identification requires, as 
Kristeva puts, “an unbelievable symbolic effort”. As it is seen, unlike the 
consolidation of male heterosexual gender identity, the consolidation of 
female heterosexual gender identity requires a great deal of effort. That 
means, a heterosexual gender identity for any woman depends on a primary 
repression of the maternal cathexis. And it is no surprise, that women may 
fail to pass this exam, and end up in homosexuality or melancholy; or at 
least, they are expected from time to time to be caught by bouts of 
melancholy. Kristeva, by assuming matricide as an indispensable moment of 
healthy subjectivity, together with the impossibility of a complete separation 
of a woman from the maternal body, infers that femininity is a melancholy 
sexuality. Due to the same reasons—his identification with his mother—the 
homosexual man is alleged to “[share] the same depressive economy” (29).  
Kristeva talks of “the tremendous psychic, intellectual, and affective 
effort a woman must make in order to find the other sex as erotic object” 
(30), while heterosexual man and homosexual woman can recover the lost 
maternal as erotic object. Indeed, one cannot overlook that a “tremendous 
psychic, intellectual, and affective effort” is involved in a woman’s 
transition to symbolic order together with her cathecting an object of a sex 
other than that of the primary maternal object. Nevertheless, considering the 
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hegemony of heterosexism, being a homosexual does not seem as a very 
helpful flight from melancholy for a woman. Maybe through being a 
homosexual, a woman has the chance to displace her love for her mother 
onto other same-sex objects; nevertheless, in this case, she confronts another 
form of impossibility because of the prevalent taboo against homosexuality. 
On that account, female homosexuality is as well a laborious a 
compensation for maternal loss. 
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Chapter-3: Judith Butler’s Theory of Melancholy Gender 
3.1. Introduction 
 “It may at first seem strange to think of gender as a kind of 
melancholy, or as one of melancholy’s effects” are the opening sentences of 
the chapter “Melancholy Gender/ Refused Identification” in The Psychic 
Life of Power (1997); in the following pages Butler goes on to affirm her 
thesis that all gender identity is founded on ungrieved loss. Although there 
have been claims that establish a relationship between discrete gender 
identities and melancholy, especially between femininity and melancholy, 
as in the works of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, Butler writes “there has 
been little effort to understand the melancholic denial/preservation of 
homosexuality in the production of gender within the heterosexual frame” 
(Gender Trouble 73). Unlike the works of Irigaray and Kristeva, which do 
not attend to the issue of the production of heterosexual identities, and take 
the heterosexual gender system as granted, Butler directly tends to the 
question of the constitution of heterosexual gender identities and its relation 
to melancholy. She scrutinizes the processes that consolidate the binary 
gender system; and deconstructs the seeming coherence of the categories of 
sex, gender, and sexuality.  
 Judith Butler’s theory of “melancholy gender” is a brilliant theory 
that forges an original link between melancholy and gender, which depends 
on the linking of the psychoanalytic account of the psyche to Foucault’s 
theory of power. Butler introduces the notion of “melancholy gender” first 
in Gender Trouble (1990; reissued 1999), later develops it in The Psychic 
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Life of Power, specifically in the chapter “Melancholy Gender/ Refused 
Identification”. Although both works are marked with Butler’s convergence 
of the Foucauldian power theory with Freudian psychoanalysis, their 
emphases are on different points. In the former work, Butler occupies her 
with elaborating her theory of “gender performativity” by using 
psychoanalytic terms. In the latter work, Butler, starting with a Foucauldian 
problematic, focuses on the issue of power, and undertakes an investigation 
of the psychic form that power takes. In this context, melancholy appears as 
one of power’s regulatory operations in the production of normative 
heterosexuality. Following Freud’s theory of melancholy, Butler takes 
melancholy as the result of ungrieved loss that is interiorized, and applies 
this structure to gender. Claiming gender to be “acquired at least in part 
through the repudiation of homosexual attachments” (PLP 136), Butler 
suggests gender melancholy as the result of ungrieved and ungrievable loss 
of homosexual attachments. 
 It should be noted that Butler, for the most part, takes melancholy in 
a social, cultural and political context. Following Freud’s theory of 
melancholy, Butler takes melancholy as the result of ungrieved loss that is 
interiorized, and applies this structure to gender. For Butler, “gender is 
acquired at least in part through the repudiation of homosexual attachments” 
(PLP 136). Since, in a heterosexist culture homosexual love is foreclosed, 
such loss can never be named and mourned, and that breeds a pervasive 
melancholy.  
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 Incorporating the psyche with the social, and proposing a way to 
think melancholy in a social, cultural and political context; I believe Butler 
inspires us to think the psychic matters, even the seemingly deepest singular 
experience or the individual pathology in the context of a wider picture.  
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3.2 Melancholic Identification:  A Paradigm of the Formation of the 
Gendered Subject 
  
 In forming her theory of gender melancholy, in conceiving “gender 
as a kind of melancholy, or as one of melancholy’s effects”, Butler heavily 
draws on the Freudian psychoanalysis, specifically on the arguments 
covered in the texts “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) and The Ego and 
the Id (1923).  As we have seen in the previous chapter, in “Mourning and 
Melancholia” Freud gives a detailed account of the mechanism of 
melancholy, which he takes as a discrete pathology; whereas in his later 
essay, in The Ego and the Id, he takes melancholia in developmental terms, 
asserts its generality in human life, and claims it to be central to the 
formation of the identifications that form the ego. Such identification is not 
momentary or occasional, but, as Butler states, “becomes a new structure of 
identity; in effect, the other becomes part of the ego through the permanent 
internalization of the other’s attributes” (GT 74).  
 Although Freud does recognize the significance of this kind of 
identification, he does not conclude that all identifications arise from object 
loss. In The Ego and the Id he points to another type of identification, which 
is “[i]ndividual's first and most important identification, his identification 
with his father in his own personal prehistory”, and states it not to be “the 
consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis”, he rather takes it as “a 
direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-
cathexis” (31).  
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 Butler incorrectly assumes that in Freudian theory all identifications 
are preceded by loss. She renounces the idea that the identification with the 
father does not follow the melancholic pattern, but claims it to be an effect 
of the loss of the father as a love-object—in the context of  identification 
with the father, Butler speaks in terms of the boy, since she is obsessed with 
the loss and repression of homosexual cathexis as the constitutive factor in 
gender acquisition; and thus remains curiously silent about the girl’s 
relationship to her father—and thus takes melancholy as the paradigm of 
ego formation. Butler ignores the fact that Freud’s postulate of primary 
paternal identification implies a necessary moment in a child’s 
development, and it applies to female children as well as male children. In 
maintaining that “because identifications substitute for object relations, and 
identifications are the consequence of loss” (GT 80), Butler generalizes all 
identifications to come about as substitutions for lost objects.  
 Following this line of thought, and extending Freud’s theory of 
melancholic identification, Butler claims the centrality of melancholy in the 
acquisition of gender identity, and writes that “[t]his process of internalizing 
lost loves becomes pertinent to gender formation when we realize that the 
incest taboo initiates a loss a loss of a love-object for the ego and the ego 
recuperates from this loss through internalization of the of the tabooed 
object of desire” (GT 75). This claim depends on her specific reading of the 
Oedipal situation and its resolution, which departs from Freud’s narrative in 
some significant points.  
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 Let us here remember the classical Oedipal story in order to follow 
Butler’s reading. In Freudian theory, Oedipus complex designates the 
child’s feelings of desire toward the parent of the opposite sex, accompanied 
by feelings of rivalry and hate towards the parent of the same-sex. The 
normal resolution of the Oedipus complex, for Freud, is achieved through 
the giving up of the object-cathexis for the parent of the opposite sex, and 
the enactment of an identification with the same-sex parent. In The Ego and 
the Id, where Freud tells this narrative in terms of the little boy, he writes 
that the little boy has to give up his “object-cathexis of his mother” and its 
place must be “filled by one of two things: either an identification with his 
mother or an intensification of his identification with his father” (32). In the 
following sentence he adds that “[w]e are acccustomed to regard the latter 
outcome as the more normal” (32). Such identification, however, is not 
concomitant with what we know about loss and the melancholic 
identification expected to follow. That means, although the melancholic 
model would produce an identification with the lost object, in this case, an 
identification with the mother; in Freud’s Oedipal model the outcome is the 
reinforcement of a preexisting identification with the father. Freud 
recognizes this inconsistency and writes “[t]hese identifications are not what 
we should have expected, since they do not introduce the abandoned object 
into the ego; but this alternative outcome may also occur” (32). In the 
following pages Freud states that, the factor that determines which 
identification—with the mother or the father—is accomplished in terms of 
the Oedipal child depends on the strength or weakness of femininity or 
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masculinity in its disposition, implying that identification with the same-sex 
parent is probable. Butler refuses this explanation, and criticizes Freud’s 
idea of sexual dispositions, which for her implies them to be “the primary 
sexual facts of the psyche”, and states sexual dispositions to be “produced 
effects of a law imposed by culture and by the complicitous and 
transvaluating acts of the ego ideal” (GT 81).  
 Unlike Freud, Butler, depending on the model of melancholic 
identification gives a quite different interpretation to the Oedipal process. 
She takes the resolution of the Oedipal situation, the acquisition of gender 
identity as a process by which the ego identifies with the lost object. I think 
that she reaches such a conclusion by starting with the fact that 
identification with the same-sex parent is the frequent outcome in the 
resolution of the Oedipal complex; and infers, depending on the model of 
melancholic identification, that since an identification with the same-sex 
parent is formed, there must have been the loss of the same-sex parent. That 
means, the girl loses her mother as a love-object, thus identifies with her; 
whereas the boy looses his father as a love-object, thus identifies with him. 
In the context of gender formation, the loss referred by Butler is imposed as 
a prohibition that is internalized in the process of forming of gender identity. 
Now, let us look at how prohibition is considered in Freudian and Butlerian 
thoughts, and how they are taken as significant in the context of gender 
formation. 
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3.2.1 The Primacy of the Taboo against Homosexuality 
  
 Butler, like Freud avows the founding role of prohibition in the 
formation sexual and gender identities, and writes: “In melancholia, the 
loved object is lost through a variety of means: separation, death, or the 
breaking of an emotional tie. In the Oedipal situation, however, the loss is 
dictated by a prohibition attended by a set of punishments” (GT 81).  
 The incest taboo is taken as the founding prohibition in Freudian 
thought. It is a corner-stone in explaining the human society and the human 
individual. In Freudian theory, the internalization of the prohibition, forced 
through castration anxiety, marks the resolution of Oedipus complex with its 
consequences of the consolidation of selfhood and gender identity. 
Although Butler asserts the role of prohibition in the formation sex and 
gender identities, in her thought the prohibition against homosexuality is the 
primary prohibition. Butler argues that the taboo against homosexuality 
must precede the incest taboo, since “the taboo against homosexuality in 
effect creates the heterosexual ‘dispositions’ by which the Oedipal complex 
becomes possible” (GT 82). For Butler, heterosexuality is generated through 
a prohibition that forces the loss of homosexual attachments. Thus, the 
heterosexual dispositions are to be regarded not as original or innate; they 
are rather to be regarded as effects of a law, which being internalized, 
produces and regulates discrete gender identity and heterosexuality. 
 In her book Judith Butler, Sara Salih states that Butler, by arguing 
that the taboo against homosexuality precedes the incest taboo, implies that 
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“the child’s primary desire is always for the parent of the same-sex” (55). 
Indeed, since Butler reads gender identification as a melancholic 
identification, and since she claims the prohibition against homosexuality to 
precede the incest taboo, she reaches the conclusion that heterosexual 
subjects are formed by a melancholic identification with an internalized 
same-sex lost object. This hypothesis of Butler is criticized by some writers, 
since they think she implies that the child has only homosexual cathexis, 
only loses a same-sex object, and thus identifies with it.11  
  Indeed Butler does not attend to the cases whereby heterosexual 
objects are cathected and lost. She confines herself to state that, in terms of 
the loss of heterosexual objects, one has the chance to substitute the lost 
heterosexual objects with other heterosexual objects, comparing it to the 
loss of homosexual objects, whereby one does not have the chance—or it is 
harder— to substitute them by establishing new homosexual cathexes. What 
poses a bigger problem in her theorizations about identification, is her 
ignoring of a child’s love for the opposite sex parent and its identification 
with him or her. This blindspot seems to come about due to her exclusive 
occupation with homosexual cathexes.  
  Nevertheless, her exclusive occupation with homosexual cathexes 
may be taken as a move by which she tries to reverse heterosexualist 
assumptions, and thus to affirm homosexual cathexes. I do not regard it 
possible that Butler does not mean that the child only has homosexual 
                                                 
11 “The oedipalized melancholics about whom Freud writes can “lose” objects of either sex; 
it is entirely possible for an opposite-sexed identification to transpire as the consequence of 
a melancholic incorporation.” (Rothenberg, Valente 2001) 
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cathexes, and only loses them. The stress that Butler puts on the loss of 
homosexual objects may be explained in the context of prevalent conditions 
of compulsory heterosexuality in which, homosexual attachments are 
rendered as illegible, abject, and non-existent. Even though we take these 
points into consideration, it is still problematic that Butler does not even 
allude to the contingency of opposite-sex identification, and just focuses on 
the same-sex identification, which she reduces to happen as an effect of 
loss. 
  Butler points to the differences between the loss of a heterosexual 
object and that of a homosexual object in terms of the heterosexual 
hegemony.  
In the case of a prohibited heterosexual union, it is the object 
which is denied, but not the modality of desire, so that the 
desire is deflected from that object onto other objects of the 
opposite sex. But in the case of a prohibited homosexual 
union, it is clear that both the desire and the object require 
renunciation and so become subject to the internalizing 
strategies of melancholia (75). 
 
 
  As we know from Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia”, the work of 
mourning- grief- is completed through decathexis- detachment of the libido 
from the object- and subsequent making of new attachments. As Butler 
states in terms of the loss of a heterosexual object, the loss is borne as grief, 
since there is no prohibition on heterosexual attachment, there is a chance of 
substitution of the lost heterosexual object with other heterosexual objects. 
Whereas “[i]n the case of the prohibition against homosexual incest through 
which heterosexual identity is established, however, the loss is sustained 
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through a melancholic structure” (88), since there is a prevalent taboo 
against homosexuality that bars the possibility of making new homosexual 
attachments. Take the case of the Oedipal girl that loses her father as a love-
object with the force of the incest taboo; in this case, she, in the future has 
the chance to displace her desire onto other opposite-sex objects. However, 
she does not have the chance to displace her desire for her mother onto other 
same-sex objects; she has to renounce, thus, lose not only the object of her 
desire, but also the aim of her desire because of the prohibition against 
homosexuality. The girl has to forget, disavow her desire in order not to 
trouble her heterosexual identity as a woman. For Butler, the girl rather 
“installs that barred object [the mother] as a part of the [her] ego, indeed, as 
a melancholic identification”; thus, “the identification contains within it 
both the prohibition and the desire and so embodies the ungrieved loss of 
the homosexual cathexis” (PLP 169). 
 
3.2.2 Never Loved, Never Lost: A Double Disavowal Which Founds 
Heterosexuality 
 
As we have stated, for Butler, heterosexual identity is established in 
part through the loss of homosexual attachments, which is enforced by the 
taboo against homosexuality. Since “the prohibition on homosexuality 
operates throughout a largely heterosexual culture as one of its defining 
operations, […]  the loss of homosexual objects and aims […] would appear 
to be foreclosed from the start” (PLP 139). The concept “foreclose” is used 
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by Butler in order to show the way in which homosexual love is rendered 
impossible from the start, to point to the way how a certain kind of unreality 
is attributed to homosexuality in a manner refusing to avow its very being. 
To foreclose homosexual love is also to foreclose its loss. Thus, under these 
circumstances, “homosexual love is subjected to a double disavowal, a 
never having loved, and a never having lost” (139). A woman insisting on 
her heterosexuality seems to be saying: “I never lost another woman, and 
hence never lost another woman”. For Butler, this never-never founds the 
heterosexual melancholic subject.  
  We know that, as long as a loss is not avowed and articulated, thus 
mourned, it results in an impossible mourning, whereby the loss is 
torturously kept inside. The taboo on homosexuality, foreclosing not only 
homosexual love, but also mourning for homosexual love, results in “a 
melancholic identification which effectively turns homosexual desire back 
upon itself” writes Butler, and states “this turning back upon itself” to be 
“precisely the action of self-beratement and guilt” (142). 
  In the context of a heterosexual culture, where the enforcement of 
the loss of homosexual cathexes is one of its defining operations, these 
ungrieved losses cannot be taken as individual cases, rather the situation is 
to be comprehended as a kind of social melancholy. “Where there is no 
public recognition or discourse which such a loss might be named or 
mourned, then melancholia takes on cultural dimensions of contemporary 
consequence” (139) writes Butler. She adds that things get harder, when 
AIDS is in question. Under such circumstances, grieving those that died of 
47 
 
AIDS becomes an impossible task, and melancholy gets more and more 
acute. Melancholy, thus, needs to be seen as one of the regulatory operations 
of power, which restrains the visibility of certain loves, ignores the reality of 
certain losses, and renders some sufferings inarticulate. 
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3.3 Melancholy and Performativity 
3.3.1 Incorporation as the Mode of Melancholic Gender Identification 
   
 Butler, in explaining how melancholic gender identifications take 
place, and in trying to answer the question where gender identifications are 
to be found, writes that “[t]he interior psychic space in which identifications 
are said to be preserved makes sense only if we can understand that interior 
space as a phantasized locale that serves yet another psychic function” (GT 
86). Drawing on Abraham and Torok, Butler concludes that gender 
identifications are incorporated.12 Designating incorporation as a fantasy, an 
antimetaphorical process means that; “the interior space into which an 
object is taken is imagined, and imagined within a language that can conjure 
and reify such spaces” (86). But, where is this in incorporated space? Unlike 
Abraham and Torok, who state that incorporated objects are encrypted in 
“an intrapsychic tomb”, Butler argues that incorporated space to be the very 
body, or the body per se. “As an antimetaphorical activity, incorporation 
literalizes the loss on or in the body and so appears as the facticity of the 
                                                 
12 The following quotation from Butler summarizes Abraham and Torok’s conception of 
incorporation, which she takes as the manner by which gender identification is 
accomplished. “Abraham and Torok suggest that introjection of the loss characteristic of 
mourning establishes an empty space, literalized by the empty mouth which becomes the 
condition of speech and signification. The successful displacement of the libido from the 
lost object is achieved through the formation of words which both signify and displace that 
object; this displacement from the original object is an essentially metaphorical activity in 
which words “figure” the absence and surpass it. Introjection is understood to be the work 
of mourning, but incorporation, which denotes a magical resolution of loss, characterizes 
melancholy. Whereas introjection founds the possibility of metaphorical signification, 
incorporation is antimetaphorical precisely because it maintains the loss as radically 
unnameable; in other words, incorporation is not only a failure to name or avow the loss, 
but erodes the conditions of metaphorical signification itself.” (GT 86-87) 
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body, the means by which the body comes to bear ‘sex’ as its literal truth” 
writes Butler (87). Thus, as Prosser writes in “Judith Butler: Queer 
Feminism and the Transubstantiation of Sex” “it is only via this fantasy of 
literalization that the body comes ‘to bear a sex’ as literal truth, that gender 
gets inscribed on the body as sex and sex appears as the literal embodiment 
of gender” (260).  
 Sara Salih writes that “[l]ike gender, the body conceals its genealogy 
and presents itself as a ‘natural fact’ or a given, whereas, by arguing that 
relinquished desire is ‘encrypted’ on the body, Butler asserts that the body is 
the effect of desire rather than its cause” (57). Indeed, in Butler’s gender 
theorization, the body appears as a phantasized surface on which the 
disavowed desire is encrypted. It is taken as a psychically incorporated 
space, a product of melancholic gender incorporation. That means, there is 
no “natural body” before its cultural inscription by gender identification, 
which is accomplished by the literalizing fantasy of incorporation; the body 
is produced, its margins and erogenous zones are defined by the internalized 
prohibition and desire. 
 
3.3.2 Gender Performativity as the Acting Out of Unresolved Grief 
  
 It is in this context that Butler develops her theory about gender 
performativity by linking it to melancholy, and formulates performativity as 
the “acting out” of unresolved grief, whereby performative genders are 
designated as allegories of gender melancholy. For Butler “[p]erformance 
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allegorizes a loss it cannot grieve, allegorizes the incorporative fantasy of 
melancholia whereby an object is phantasmatically taken in or on as a way 
of refusing to let it go”; thus “gender itself might be understood in part as 
the ‘acting out’ of unresolved grief” (PLP 145-146). “The straight man 
becomes (mimes, cites, appropriates, assumes the status of) the man he 
“never” loved and never grieved; the straight woman becomes the woman 
she never loved and never grieved. It is in this sense then, that what is most 
apparently performed as gender is the sign and symptom of a pervasive 
disavowal” (PLP 147). 
  Butler takes drag as the iconographic figure of gender melancholy in 
illustrating the fantasies that consolidate gender.  
Drag thus allegorizes heterosexual melancholy, the 
melancholy by which a masculine gender is formed from the 
refusal to grieve the masculine as a possibility of love; a 
feminine gender is formed (taken on, assumed) through the 
incorporative fantasy by which the feminine is excluded as a 
possible object of love, an exclusion never grieved, but 
'preserved' through the heightening of feminine identification 
itself (PLP 177). 
 
  Although Butler is primarily concerned with heterosexual 
melancholy-- since what is pervasive is heterosexual melancholy- she does 
not mention that only heterosexual people suffer gender melancholy, she 
does as well mention homosexual melancholy. As Salih states in The Judith 
Butler Reader, for Butler, “[a]ll stable gender identities are melancholic, 
founded on a prohibited primary desire that is written on the body and […] 
rigid gender boundaries conceal the loss of an original, unacknowledged and 
unresolved love” (57). Butler thinks that, a homosexual—like the 
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heterosexual, who maintains the repressed homosexuality through 
melancholic incorporation—maintains that heterosexuality, which she may 
find unthinkable. That means, no matter what sexual position is in question, 
any sexual position becomes haunted by what it excluded. Nevertheless, for 
Butler, heterosexual and homosexual melancholy cannot be taken as parallel 
experiences, since “the heterosexual refusal to acknowledge the primary 
homosexual attachment is culturally enforced by a prohibition on 
homosexuality” (GT 89). 
  What is also provided in rethinking the notion of gender 
performativity through melancholy is the way in which it revises the 
seeming voluntarism implied in the notion of gender performativity. The 
following quotation from her essay “Reply to Adam Phillips” explains how 
the theory of melancholy gender, with its implication of a kind of loss that is 
enforced by the taboo against homosexuality regulates the performance of 
gender. 
If I acquire my gender through the repudiation of my love for 
one of my own gender, then that repudiation lives on in the 
acting out of my gender, a repudiation that calls to be read in 
terms of rivalry, aggression, idealization, and melancholia. If 
I am a woman to the extent that I have never loved one, there 
is both aggression and shame locked into that “never,” that 
“no way,” which suggests that whatever gender I am is 
threatened fundamentally by the return of that love rendered 
unthinkable by that defensive “never.” And what I act, 
indeed, what I “choose,” has something therefore profoundly 
unchosen in it that runs through the course of that 
“performance” (90). 
   
  Butler argues that the notion of gender performativity is to be 
rethought through melancholy, through the notion of acting out—acting out 
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of unresolved grief—and “in the pantomimic response to loss whereby the 
lost other is incorporated as the very formative identifications of the ego” 
(90). 
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3.4 Melancholy and Power 
  
 In “Introduction” we stated that Butler’s theory of melancholy 
gender, which is informed by a queer feminist critique, constructs the 
relation between melancholy and the production of normative heterosexual 
identity.  Hitherto we have covered that law, specifically the taboo against 
homosexuality, by enforcing the loss of homosexual attachments regulates 
the performance of gender, thus reproduces the heterosexual matrix. Still, 
how the taboo against homosexuality operates at the individual level, how 
the internalization of the taboo as an interior moral directive is achieved 
needs more explanation. These questions lead us to the complex relationship 
between subject and power, especially to the issue of the subject’s 
assumption of power, which Butler discusses in The Psychic Life of Power.  
 
3.4.1 An Account of Psychic Subjection 
  
 The Psychic Life of Power presents a linking of Foucauldian and 
psychoanalytic theories aiming to elaborate the way power constitutes the 
subject, which, for Butler, is possible only with an inclusion of a theory of 
psyche. The text begins with an introduction of Foucauldian notion of 
power and its assumption of subjection as the simultaneous subordination 
and forming of the subject. According to this notion of power, which Butler 
avows, the relationship between the subject and power is not taken as a 
mechanical process, whereby norms are enforced on a subject, and later 
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internalized by the subject as they are. Such an account presupposes a given 
subject and a sovereign working of power. Rather, subjection “designates a 
certain kind of restriction in production, a restriction without which the 
production of the subject cannot take place, a restriction through which that 
production takes place” (84). 
 What Butler considers to be missing from Foucault’s account of the 
subject, is an elaboration of “the specific mechanisms of how the subject is 
formed in submission” (2), the way power constitutes the subject. For 
Butler, this paradox of subjection—implying subjectivity and subjugation at 
once—may be explained by referring to psychoanalysis and its conception 
of psyche. “An account of subjection must be traced in the turns of the 
psychic life […] in the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes 
place in the acts of self-reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in 
tandem with processes of social regulation” writes Butler (18-19).  
 Butler determines a desire for the norm and for subjection, and 
explains it by referring to “a prior desire for social existence”, which she 
illustrates in terms of the dependency of the infant, who has no choice other 
than to depend and form an attachment in order to persist in psychic and 
social sense, and also in the material sense. About the desire for social 
existence, which motivates one’s assumption of power, Butler contends 
“where social categories guarantee a recognizable and enduring social 
existence, the embrace of such categories, even as they work in the service 
of subjection, is often preferred to no social existence at all” (20).  
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 Through a reading of Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault and 
Althusser, Butler follows what she calls “the subject’s structuring 
attachment to subjection”. What is common in their accounts of the subject 
is the implication of a kind of reflexivity accompanied by attitudes of self-
beratement and self-renunciation. For Butler, the psychic form of power is 
marked by this reflexive gesture, “a figure of turning, a turning back upon 
oneself or even a turning on oneself” which “operates as part of the 
explanation of how a subject is produced, and so there is no subject […] 
who makes this turn”; rather “the turn appears as the tropological 
inauguration of the subject” (PLP 3). It is through this turn that the 
individual assumes power, and becomes a subject; in short “becomes the 
principle of its own subjection”. 
 In her “melancholy gender” theory, Butler asserts that the ungrieved 
loss of the homosexual cathexes prompts “a melancholic identification 
which effectively turns homosexual desire back upon itself”, whereby 
homosexual desire is transformed into guilt. Drawing on Freud, Butler 
maintains the ego-ideal to be “precisely the ideal of social rectitude defined 
over and against homosexuality” (141).  
 
3.4.2 The Disciplinary Production of Gender 
  
 Although Freud states that the “normal” or “the most frequent” 
resolution of the Oedipus complex is that the children identify with the 
object parents, he does not mention that these identifications occur within 
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the taboos and laws of the heterosexual matrix. Butler argues that regulation 
of sexuality works through “a foreclosure that structures the forms that any 
attachment may assume” (GT 24) and links it to “the Foucauldian notion of 
a regulatory ideal”,  “an ideal according to which certain forms of love 
become possible, and others, impossible” (25). Under the prevalent 
conditions of heterosexuality, needless to say, the attachments that are 
foreclosed are the homosexual ones, while the regulatory ideal is that of 
heterosexuality. 
 As Freud does, Butler takes the super-ego and the ego ideal13 as the 
regulatory mechanisms through which social ideals are psychically 
maintained. She contends the ego ideal to be involved in the internalization 
of gender identities, and in the successful consolidation of masculinity and 
femininity, and the law of heterosexuality (79-80). That means, the 
prohibition against homosexuality operates at the individual level through 
the construction of the ego ideal, which prescribes “the appropriate 
rechanneling and sublimation of desire” (80). Thus, for Butler, gender 
dispositions are not “the primary sexual facts of the psyche, but produced 
effects of a law imposed by culture and by the complicitous and 
transvaluating acts of the ego ideal” (81).  
 The prohibition against homosexuality forces the individual to 
approximate the heterosexual ideal. However, achieving the heterosexual 
                                                 
13 In Gender Trouble Butler does not discriminate between the terms ego-ideal and super-
ego, uses them interchangeably, indeed uses the term ego-ideal instead of super-ego in the 
contexts where the term super-ego is appropriate. (In the 24th of the “Notes to Chapter 2” in 
this book she writes that Freud does not make a distinction between them in The Ego and 
the Id (207) and she does the same. Whereas in The Psychic Life of Power, she makes the 
necesssary distinction between these terms by writing “[w]ithin psychoanalysis we think of 
social sanction as encoded in the ego-ideal and patrolled by the super-ego”(25). 
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ideal is not a singular act but an ever-lasting process; it is a ritualized 
production regulated through the internalized force of prohibition.  
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Conclusion 
 
Starting with the aim of investigating “the gendered subject of 
melancholy”, we have covered the works of Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler 
regarding the relationship between melancholy and gender. Their works 
present disparate engagements with the topic due to their specific projects 
and the singular contexts of their writings. The work of Kristeva, located at 
the intersection of semiotics/linguistics and psychoanalysis, and depending 
on Lacan’s integration of Freudian psychoanalysis and structural semiology 
focuses on the melancholic subject’s uneasy relation to signifying bonds. 
Consequent to an argumentation pointing to the feminine subject’s unique 
relation to the maternal body, she claims continuity between femininity and 
melancholy, and thus, designates the subject of melancholy as woman. On 
the other hand, Judith Butler’s theorizations about the relationship between 
melancholy and gender constitute “a certain cultural engagement with 
psychoanalytic theory that belongs neither to the fields of psychology nor to 
psychoanalysis, but that nevertheless seeks to establish an intellectual 
relationship to those enterprises” (PLP 138). Motivated by the Foucauldian 
problematic of the tangled relationship between power and subject, Butler 
makes use of psychoanalytic theory in order to elaborate the Foucauldian 
account of subjection. As distinct from those works, which claim a 
relationship between discrete gender identities and melancholy, especially 
between femininity and melancholy; “melancholy gender” proves to be a 
challenging theory in its novel treatment of melancholy as intrinsic to 
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gender as such. According to Butler’s theory, heterosexual gender identity is 
acquired in part through the foreclosure/loss of homosexual attachments. 
Within Butler’s Foucauldian problematic, “melancholic denial/preservation 
of homosexuality in the production of gender within the heterosexual 
frame” appears as one of the regulatory mechanisms of power.  
 
A Critique of Julia Kristeva’s Melancholy Theory: Is Melancholy 
Woman?  
As we have seen, Kristeva alleges the female subject to be more 
vulnerable than the male subject to melancholy because of the specific 
relation she has to her mother and to her mother’s body, that is, to the 
(maternal) Thing. Kristeva, by considering matricide as a necessary 
condition of autonomous, thus, for her, healthy subjectivity, together with 
the impossibility of a complete separation of a woman from the maternal 
body, infers that femininity is a melancholy sexuality. For women, a 
complete act of matricide seems impossible owing to their identification 
with their mothers. On the other hand, since identification with the mother is 
the normative identification for the girl in the context of heterosexual 
culture, her not establishing identification with the mother will trouble her 
gender, and cause other complications, of which costs are hardly less than 
identifying with the mother. That means, for Kristeva, all roads lead to a 
dead end situation for women.  
In Black Sun, Kristeva argues that it is only through psychoanalysis 
that a thorough psychic transformation can take place. She also praises work 
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of art as a therapeutic device, which secures “sublimatory hold over the lost 
Thing”; but nevertheless she prioritizes analysis as “an elaboration in the 
sense of ‘becoming aware’ of the inter- and intrapsychic causes of moral 
suffering […] which aims at dissolving this symptom” (24). It is indeed 
curious that in Black Sun three of the four melancholy artists that Kristeva 
covers are men; while all subjects of the clinical, thus undesirable, cases of 
melancholy that she includes are women14. Thus, Juliana Schiesari in The 
Gendering of Melancholia (1992) seems right to maintain “when 
melancholia is considered undesirable it is stereotypically metaphorized as 
feminine or viewed as an affliction women bring on men; when melancholia 
is valued as a creative condition, however, its privilege is grounded on an 
implicit or explicit exclusion of women” (18). 
Although Kristeva is certain about the greater frequency of 
depression in woman, she does not need to take into account the possible 
social and cultural factors that might help to give a fuller account about 
women’s depression; but rather she is contended with her postulation of 
feminine melancholy as a result of maternal identification. Relating to this 
frailty of Kristeva’s theory of feminine melancholy: Kelly Oliver in The 
Colonization of Psychic Space (2004) writes that Kristeva’s “account of 
feminine sexuality in Black Sun only gives us recourse to an infinite regress 
of depressed mothers to account for any particular case of depression”, 
according to which “we can diagnose the mother’s depression as a result of 
                                                 
14 Here, we are to remember Kristeva’s work on female genius, her Female Genius 
trilogy.in order not to do injustice to her by claiming she excusively considers men when 
creativity and genius are in question. 
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her own identification with her mother, that is, with what Kristeva calls the 
maternal thing that traps her in an unrepresentable realm of buried affects” 
(109). For Oliver Kristeva’s theory of feminine depression “either begs the 
question of the depressive mother or leaves us wondering if depression is a 
natural or essential part of the female or maternal psyche, neither of which 
adequately explains maternal depression” (110). Oliver claims a reading of 
maternal/ female depression as a form of social melancholy, which points 
“the loss of a lovable and loved self-image” in terms of the woman, to be 
more productive. According to this account, the woman is not melancholic 
because she identifies with her mother, but because she identifies through 
her mother with a socially devalued femininity. What constitute the core of 
woman’s melancholy then are the social norms, which enforce woman to 
identify with the mother while at the same time, devalue that very maternity.  
 
A Critique of Judith Butler’s Melancholy Gender Theory 
 
We have stated Judith Butler’s theory of melancholy gender to be 
distinctive by the way it connects melancholy and gender in a novel fashion. 
Her theory leads to considering melancholy as an operation of power, as a 
process through which one turns against oneself, and becomes the principle 
of its own subjection. Butler inculcates the psychoanalytic notion of 
melancholy with a sociopolitical sense, and offers a relationship between the 
psyche and the social. She shows that our affects like grief, shame, and guilt 
cannot be understood by taking them as exclusively intra-psychic and inter-
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psychic phenomena; but they also need to be approached as effects of social 
and political processes. On that account, a cure for our sufferings cannot 
only be found in the consulting room or on the individual level, but it also 
comes about by opening up space in the social realm through which we will 
have an opportunity to articulate our affects and experiences.  
 It seems that Butler in regarding melancholic identification as the 
structure of gender formation, she aims to affirm the primacy and generality 
of homosexual cathexes. This aim, I think, leads her to a strategic use of 
psychoanalytic concepts and theories, and thus, to a reductionist 
appropriation of the psychoanalytic theory. We have covered some of the 
reductions she does because of her privileged occupation with the loss of 
homosexual object: the way she ignores identification with the opposite sex, 
and any kind of identification that does not follow the melancholic pattern. 
Rather she claims the father as the primary object for the boy, but she does 
not substantiate that argument.  
 Melancholy, for Butler, works out as a pattern in explaining the 
formation of the heterosexual subject. She ignores the different experiences 
of melancholy, thus the different affects involved, in achieving a feminine 
gender identity and a masculine gender identity; and thus levels the 
differences between psychosexual developments of different sexes. It is 
obvious that melancholy gender would be a more illuminating and 
compelling theory if it took notice of sexual difference. 
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